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JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is as set
forth in Appellant's brief and is not disputed.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The issues on appeal are substantively those set forth
in Appellant's brief, i.e. whether the trial court abused its
discretion in refusing to give one instruction requested by
plaintiff, and in allowing defendants' expert accident
reconstructionist to testify.

However, the statement of the

issues in Appellant's brief excludes key factual points on the
first issue and adds inaccurate factual points on the second
issue.

A more germane statement of the issues is as follows:
ISSUE I:

DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR

IN REFUSING TO GIVE AN INSTRUCTION INFORMALLY REQUESTED BY
PLAINTIFF, WHICH WAS NOT IN COMPLIANCE WITH UTAH RULE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 51 OR WITH THE PRETRIAL ORDER, WHERE THE TRIAL COURT
CONCLUDED THAT THE SUBSTANCE OF THE REQUESTED INSTRUCTION WAS
ADEQUATELY COVERED BY OTHER INSTRUCTIONS?
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
As indicated in Appellant's brief, the trial court has
discretion in deciding whether to give a requested instruction,
and the Court of Appeals may reverse the trial court's Judgment
only in the case of an abuse of discretion.
Wistisen, 701 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah 1985).

E.g., Pearce v.

The PreTrial Order

governs the trial, Citizens Cas. Co. v. Hackett. 17 Utah 2d 304,
410 P.2d 767 (1965), and the trial court has discretion in
enforcing the PreTrial Order, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 16(d).
ISSUE II:

DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR

IN ALLOWING DEFENDANTS7 EXPERT WITNESS (ACCIDENT
RECONSTRUCTIONIST) TO TESTIFY, WHERE DEFENDANTS7 COUNSEL HAD
DISCLOSED THE IDENTITY OF THAT WITNESS AT THE PRETRIAL SCHEDULING
CONFERENCE, THERE WAS NO COURT ORDER REQUIRING THE DESIGNATION OF
WITNESSES, PLAINTIFF7S COUNSEL HAD NEVER SOUGHT A MOTION TO
COMPEL ON INTERROGATORIES PERTAINING TO THE PARTIES7 WITNESSES,
AND THE PRETRIAL ORDER REFLECTED THE NAME OF THAT WITNESS?
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
This issue is also governed by an abuse of discretion,
as set forth in Appellant7s brief.

Id.

Berrett v. Denver and

Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., Inc.. 830 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah App. 1992)
(the appellate court shall not "interfere with a trial court's
case management unless its actions amount to an abuse of
discretion"; a trial court may not exclude witnesses from
testifying absent a specific order with a specific deadline for
designating witnesses).

2

DETERMINATIVE RULES
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 16(d):
(d) Sanctions, If a party or a party's
attorney fails to obey a scheduling or
pretrial order . . . the court, upon motion
or its own initiative, may make such orders
with regard thereto as are just, and among
others, any of the orders provided in
Rule 37(b)(2)(B), (C), (D) . • . .
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 51:
At the close of the evidence or at such
earlier time as the court reasonably directs,
any party may file written requests that the
court instruct the jury on the law as set
forth in said requests. . . .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

This case arose out of a double automobile

accident on October 12, 1988. The first collision occurred when
a vehicle driven by the sixteen-year-old defendant, Scott
Shipley, slipped on a wet road and came to a near stop; a vehicle
driven by a third party collided with it and forced it across the
roadway in front of a vehicle driven by plaintiff.

Defendants

presented a defense that defendant's actions were not negligent
with regard to plaintiff, and that defendant's actions did not
cause plaintiff's injuries.

3

2.

A PreTrial Scheduling Conference was held on

October 6, 1992; the case was tried to a jury from January 4-7,
1993.
3.

Plaintiff and plaintiff's counsel, Ned Siegfried,

became aware that defendant had retained Ronald Probert as an
expert accident reconstructionist no later than the PreTrial
Scheduling Conference of October 6, 1992•

In that Scheduling

Conference, the following exchange occurred:
THE COURT: Do you have any other experts
lined up at this point?
MR. DAVIES: I think we will probably use an
accident reconstructionist. I have talked to
Mr. Ron Probert about that.

4.

At the PreTrial Conference, the court instructed

counsel to exchange witness lists if their witnesses were
different from those disclosed during the PreTrial Conference.
The court gave counsel the following verbal instructions at the
PreTrial Scheduling Conference:
THE COURT: . . . I would like a proposed
PreTrial Order to me by December 21, and I
would like you to prepare that,
Mr. Siegfried. That may not be complicated,
just set out the issues and the witnesses
that you each intend to call. I would like a
list of witnesses to be exchanged between you
two by the —
you should know that by
November 2 so that there is no surprise.
That will give you time if you need to depose
one before then, you could do that.
4

MR. SIEGFRIED: Okay.
THE COURT: But I don't anticipate your
witnesses would be much different than those
we have discussed here today. If they are,
you should notify each other immediately.
R. 765 (Partial Transcript of PreTrial Scheduling Conference,
October 6, 1992) .
5.

The court entered no written order requiring the

designation of expert witnesses by any specified date.

Although

the court asked counsel to exchange witness lists of any
witnesses not designated during the PreTrial Scheduling
Conference, defendants' counsel designated Mr. Probert at that
time, so further designation was unnecessary.
6.

Because counsel for plaintiff did not submit a

PreTrial Order as instructed by the court, counsel for defendant
prepared a proposed PreTrial Order (see Addendum) and submitted
it for consideration on December 21, 1992. That proposed
PreTrial Order again listed Mr. Ronald Probert as defendant's
expert witness.

R. 2 62.

As the court has noted, there was no

objection to that proposed PreTrial Order from plaintiff's
counsel, so the court signed the Order.

R. 650 (Hearing on

Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial, May 25, 1993).
7.

Both parties owed Answers to Interrogatories to

one another, but neither party ever sent formally signed Answers.
Counsel for defendants had offered to provide his clients' signed
5

Answers to Interrogatories, if plaintiff would also submit his
signed Answers to defendants' Interrogatories,

However,

plaintiff failed to submit those responses and so defendant did
not submit his either•

Furthermore, neither party filed a Motion

to Compel Discovery, to force the issue.
8.

Counsel for plaintiff first objected to defendants

calling Ronald Probert as an expert witness on the first day of
trial, January 4, 1993, by way of a Motion in Limine.

R. 659

(Arguments on Motions in Limine immediately prior to commencement
of trial, January 4, 1993).

In making that motion, plaintiff's

counsel (John Fay) stated that the first notice that his office
had of defendants' expert, Ronald Probert, was on December 18,
1992.

Id.

Counsel for defendant responded that he had notified

plaintiff's counsel (Mr. Siegfried) that he would call Ron
Probert as an expert witness either at the PreTrial or shortly
thereafter, and that defendants' counsel had also offered
plaintiff's counsel the opportunity to depose Mr. Probert
one-and-a-half to two months earlier.

R. 660-61.

The court,

Judge Page, stated that his notes from the PreTrial "were that
the defendant indicated at that time [the PreTrial Scheduling
Conference] that Ron Probert would be the accident
reconstructionist . . . and so I do not find that these witnesses
come as any surprise to the plaintiff."
6

R. 662. The court also stated:

Further the Court would find that if you
wished to do anything about it prior to
today's date, you should have done it and not
wait until today's date and then come in with
these motions to exclude them and I will deny
both of these motions.
Id.
9.

Plaintiff's proposed Jury Instructions submitted

in accordance with the PreTrial Order did not contain the
proposed instruction upon which plaintiff now bases part of his
appeal.

R. 213-16.

In fact, counsel has been unable to locate

the requested instruction as part of the court record, presumably
because it was not properly submitted as a formal Request.

That

instruction was proposed and submitted informally to the court
and to defense counsel on the last day of trial.

R. 615 (Partial

Transcript regarding Discussion on Jury Instructions, January 7,
1993) .
10.

The only information that plaintiff's counsel gave

to the court regarding the supposed need for that instruction
occurred during two parts of the discussion in chambers regarding
jury instructions, just prior to the court's instructing the jury
and holding closing arguments.

Counsel for plaintiff, John Fay,

made the following two comments:
MR. FAY: . . . I do have one or two other
things, additional ones. I presented
Mr. Davies with an instruction concerning a
minor engaged in an adult activity that I
would like to be given.
7

R. 615.

Later during that discussion in chambers, the following

exchange occurred:
THE COURT: Do you, Mr. Fay, wish to take any
exceptions to the Court's proposed Jury
Instructions?
MR. FAY: Only in the sense, your Honor, that
I wanted one or two instructions that I
thought were appropriate and the Court has
refused and I would take exception to that,
and that is my jury instruction concerning a
minor engaging in an adult activity, that the
minor has to be held to the standard of the
adult in that activity.
R. 634.
11.

At the trial of this matter, the court gave ten

different instructions to the jury touching on the issue of
negligence and standard of care.

Those were Jury Instructions

Nos. 14, 15, 16, 19, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27 and 28.
173-78 (see Addendum).

R. 164-66, 169,

Those instructions gave specific

information to the jury about the standard of care applicable to
the driver of a motor vehicle.

None of those instructions state

that a minor is held to less than an adult standard of care in
driving a motor vehicle.
12.

Following the discussion in chambers regarding

proposed jury instructions and the court's refusal to give the
proposed instruction requested by plaintiff's counsel, R. 635,
the court instructed the jury and counsel gave closing argument.
The closing argument of defendants' counsel focused on issues of
8

proximate cause and damages, but defense counsel's argument did
contain some references to the appropriateness of the
sixteen-year-old defendant's driving at the time of the accident.
Plaintiff's counsel did not object to any of those references.
R. 582-603 (Transcript of Closing Arguments, January 7, 1993).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.

Plaintiff failed to submit the proposed instruction

about which he now complains pursuant to a proper written request
as required by Rule 51 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The

request did not comply with the requirements of the PreTrial
Order, either.

The court's refusal to give the instruction was

not an abuse of discretion because the requested instruction was
untimely, duplicative, potentially confusing, and incomplete in
its statement of the law.

The instructions given by the court,

taken as a whole, adequately instructed the jury on the
plaintiff's theory of the case.
II.

Plaintiff's counsel was aware of the identity and

availability for a deposition, of defendant's expert accident
reconstructionist at the time of the PreTrial Scheduling
Conference three months before trial.

Defendants' counsel

complied with the court's order in designating that witness both
at the PreTrial Conference and in the PreTrial Order. Therefore,

9

plaintiff, was not prejudiced by the court's allowing that
witness to testify.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS, TAKEN AS A WHOLE, FAIRLY
APPRISED THE JURY OF THE STANDARD OF CARE APPLICABLE
TO DEFENDANT SCOTT SHIPLEY.
A.
The Trial Court May Refuse to Give an Instruction if it
is Unnecessary or Substantially Covered by Other
Instructions.
The Utah Supreme Court and Utah Court of Appeals have
repeatedly addressed the standard applicable to the trial court's
refusal to give the requested jury instruction.

For example, in

Goode v. Dayton Disposal, Inc., 738 P.2d 638, 640-41 (Utah 1987),
the court ruled:
[T]he jury will be deemed to have been
properly instructed when the jury
instructions, taken as a whole, adequately
set forth the law applicable to the issues to
be determined by the jury. The fact that a
requested instruction accurately states the
relevant law does not require that the
instruction be given, provided its substance
was included elsewhere in the instructions.
Accord. Watters v. Query. 626 P.2d 455, 458-59 (Utah 1981);
Lamkin v. Lynch, 600 P.2d 530, 533 (Utah 1979); Black v.
McKnight, 562 P.2d 621, 622 (Utah 1979); Harmon v. Sprouse-Reitz
Co., 21 Utah 361, 445 P.2d 773, 774 (1968) (requested instruction
"substantially covered" by instructions "taken as a whole");
10

Meier v. Christensen, 15 Utah 2d 182, 389 P.2d 734, 735 (1964);
Ostler v, Albina Transfer Co., Inc., 781 P.2d 445 (Utah App.
1987), cert, denied 795 P.2d 1138; Biswell v. Duncan, 742 P.2d
80, 82 (Utah App. 1987) (specific proposed instruction on
negligence per se and emergency were adequately covered by more
general instructions).
Several cases have applied this issue more specifically
in automobile accident cases involving personal injuries, holding
that the trial court need not give specific requested
instructions pertaining to discrete liability issues if the
substance of the requested instruction is covered by more general
liability instructions.

For example, in Lee v. Howes, 548 P.2d

619 (Utah 1976), the plaintiff requested a specific instruction
that the area where the accident occurred was a residential area
and that the driver "had a duty to exercise care for the presence
of children reasonably to be expected in or near the street in
such an area."

Id. at 621. However, the court concluded that:

The situation was fairly and amply covered by
the court's instructions. They included the
standard definition of negligence: that the
driver must exercise the degree of care which
a reasonable and prudent person would under
the circumstances; and that he must have due
regard for the existing conditions of the
road, the traffic thereon, the actual and
potential hazards; and must keep a proper
lookout, and control of her car.
Id.
11

Similarly, in Maltby v, Cox Constr. Co,. Inc., 598 P.2d
336 (Utah 1979), cert, denied 444 U.S. 945, the plaintiff
requested an instruction that if a driver collided with another
vehicle stopped or slowing on the highway in front of him, that
is "some evidence" that the driver was driving at too high a
speed or following too closely.

The Court concluded that this

instruction was properly refused in light of the other
instructions defining the duties and responsibilities of the
parties, including keeping a proper lookout, keeping the vehicle
under control and using reasonable care under the circumstances.
Accord. Joraensen v. Issa, 739 P.2d 80, 82 (Utah App. 1987).
B.

Plaintiff's Proposed Instruction is Not Part of the
Record, and Was Not in Compliance With Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure 51 or the PreTrial Order*
In the case at bar, plaintiff's requested jury

instruction was not properly submitted pursuant to a written
Request.

It is not even part of the record on appeal, and

therefore should not be considered by the Court of Appeals.
However, if the Court does elect to address it, plaintiff's
argument fails in any event.
Rule 51 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure permits a
party to request jury instructions by filing "written requests
that the court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in said
requests."

The instruction that the plaintiff wished to have
12

given, and about which plaintiff currently complains, was not
made in that manner.

It was submitted in writing, but informally

and without an attached pleading or written Request.

A written

proposed instruction does not constitute a written Request in
compliance with Rule 51.
In addition, the plaintiff did not request that
instruction in compliance with the PreTrial Order, which provided
that counsel were submitting proposed jury instructions on
December 21, 1992, and that "no additional requests for
instructions are contemplated, unless counsel can demonstrate a
need to address unanticipated legal or factual issues arising
during trial."

PreTrial Order, R. 260. The instruction that

plaintiff requested did not involve an "unanticipated legal or
factual" issue, nor did counsel for plaintiff seek to demonstrate
a need to address an unanticipated legal or factual issue in
making the request.

Accordingly, that instruction was not

submitted in compliance with the PreTrial Order governing the
trial of this case.
C.

Plaintiff Cannot Establish that the Instructions Given
Misled the Jury or Failed to Instruct Them Properly on
the Law.
More importantly, though, even if a request for the

subject instruction had been properly made, plaintiff must
demonstrate that the jury instructions actually given, taken
13

together, did not properly instruct the jury on the law; further,
plaintiff must show that the information in the requested
instruction was not given in other instructions.

Madsen v.

Brown, 701 P.2d 1986, 1092 (Utah 1985); Moore v. Burton Lumber &
Hardware Co,, 631 P.2d 865, 871 (Utah 1981); Maltbv v. Cox
Constr. Co., Inc., 598 P.2d 336 (Utah 1979) (cert, denied 100
S.Ct. 306); Meier v. Christensen. 15 Utah 2d 182, 389 P.2d 734,
735 (1964); Ostler v. Albina Transfer Co., Inc., 781 P.2d 445,
451 (Utah App. 1989), cert, denied 795 P.2d 1138.
The court accurately stated, in refusing to give that
instruction, that the other instructions adequately apprised the
jury of the law.

As set forth in the Statement of Facts, the

court gave ten instructions regarding negligence and standard of
care.

(See Addendum.)

All of those instructions are regularly

used in cases involving adults.

None of those instructions

stated that defendant Scott Shipley would be held to less than an
adult standard of care.

In fact, several of those instructions

advised the jury about the standard of care applicable to the
driver of a motor vehicle (without any reference to age or
experience)•

The requested instruction would not have added

appreciably to the instructions that were in fact given.
Plaintiff now contends that counsel for defendants
attempted to take advantage of this in both opening statement and
14

closing argument.

However, counsel for plaintiff made no

objection to any statements made by counsel for defendants in
opening or closing, and therefore failed to provide the court
with any opportunity to correct a misstatement, if one in fact
occurred, during either opening or closing.

Plaintiff also

failed to preserve any objection that could have been made.
However, procedural issues aside, counsel for defendants in
closing only relied on the content of Jury Instruction No. 14,
which is a Model Utah Jury Instruction - MUJI 3.2.

That

instruction, which is based on accepted Utah case law, JIFU
Instructions and BAJI Instructions, provides that reasonable care
is what an ordinary, prudent person uses in similar situations,
that reasonableness depends on the situation, and that the jury
must decide what "a prudent person with similar knowledge would
do in a similar situation."

R 164.

Counsel for defendants

simply argued in closing argument that the jury must take into
account the specific situation with which defendant Scott Shipley
was confronted, and determine "what a prudent person with similar
knowledge" would have done in that same situation.

In evaluating

"a prudent person with similar knowledge", the jury is entitled
to consider attributes applicable to the defendant, including his
age.

This does not mean that a different standard of care

applies to a sixteen-year-old driver.
15

It does mean that in

applying the universally accepted standard to any defendant, the
jury can take the party's circumstances, including age, into
account in accessing negligence.

Furthermore, if counsel for

plaintiff felt that the jury had been misled by any statements
made by counsel for defendants, counsel for plaintiff not only
could have objected to such, but also had the opportunity in
closing argument to make a contrary argument.
D.

Although Sixteen-Year Old Drivers May be Held to an
Adult Standard of Care, the Application of That
Standard Allows Consideration of the Circumstances of
the Alleged Negligence. Including the Driver's Age and
Driving Experience,
The one Utah case most directly addressing this issue

was the 194 0 Utah Supreme Court case of Nelson v. Arrowhead
Freight Lines, LTD, 104 P.2d 225 (Utah 1940).

This opinion dealt

with two cases, one of which involved a sixteen-year-old
passenger in an automobile, who purportedly violated provisions
of the Utah Motor Vehicle Code by blocking the vision of the
driver.

The issues on appeal included the question of whether a

sixteen-year-old should be held to an adult standard of care.
The court noted that young people over the age of fourteen years
are normally presumed to be held to an adult standard of care and
that a presumption of adult responsibility attaches to young
people old enough to operate a motor vehicle.

However, the Utah

Supreme Court also found that even though an adult standard of
16

care applies, that a jury may consider all facts and
circumstances surrounding the automobile collision, including the
age of the driver.
In Nelson, counsel for the heirs of the
sixteen-year-old decedent had requested an instruction advising
the jury that the sixteen-year-old decedent should be held to a
lesser standard of care.1

The Court found that whether or not

that such an instruction would have been helpful, that it was not
necessary because the jury was adequately instructed by the jury
instructions as a whole.

Specifically, the court told the jury

that it could consider all the facts and circumstances
surrounding the collision, which the Utah Supreme Court
interpreted to include the decedent's age.
As indicated above the court instructed the
jury that it "must find and determine from

all the facts and circumstances
shown to
exist at the time of the collision
herein
whether either of the occupants, Paul E.
Nelson or Ramona Smith [the sixteen year old
decedent], was guilty of contributory
lr

The Court stated: "Plaintiff's second assignment is based
upon the court's refusal to give plaintiffs' requested Instruction
No. 3, which reads: 'You are instructed, members of the jury, that
contributory negligence is the want of ordinary care and prudence
on the part of person injured, contributing directly and
proximately to the injury complained of. In this connection you
are instructed that Ramona Smith [the sixteen year old decedent]
was required to exercise only that degree of care and caution which
persons of like age, capacity and experience might be reasonably
expected to naturally and ordinarily use in the same situation and
under like circumstances.'
17

negligence in becoming a passenger in the
Ford coupe along with the driver and other
occupants therein. (Italics added,)
Those facts and circumstances included the
fact of age of the deceased, physical and
mental development, general past experiences,
and all matters which would have been before
them had the requested instructions been
given. We do not hold that the requested
instruction was improper nor that it might
not have been better to give it. What we do
hold is that in view of the record and the
instructions given, the failure of the court
to give the requested instruction is not
reversible error.
104 P.2d at 229.
In the case before this Court, the jury was properly
instructed and was given more than adequate instructions to
apprise them of the standard of care applicable to the defendant,
Scott Shipley.

There has been no sufficient showing that the

jury was misled in any way by the instructions given.
Considering the instructions that were in fact given in their
entirety, the jury had all the tools that they needed to render a
proper and fair decision herein.
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POINT II
A PARTY'S WITNESSES MAY NOT BE EXCLUDED AT
TRIAL UNLESS THAT PARTY HAS FAILED TO COMPLY WITH A COURT
ORDER REGARDING DESIGNATION OF WITNESSES.
Plaintiff complains that counsel for defendants failed
to disclose the names of his expert accident reconstructionist at
a required time before trial.

Counsel for defendant specifically

disclosed the identity of that expert, Ronald Probert, at the
PreTrial Scheduling Conference.

Furthermore, no court order was

ever entered requiring an additional designation of expert
witnesses, except in the PreTrial Order.
In response to an additional request for these names of
defendants' experts, counsel for defendants voluntarily submitted
those names, again, in his letter of December 18, 1992 to Ned
Siegfried.

This designation was repeated once more in the

PreTrial Order.

Therefore, not only is there no order requiring

a designation, but counsel for plaintiff was aware of that expert
in any event.
In the case of Berrett v. Denver and Rio Grande W. R.R.
Co., Inc.. 830 P.2d 291 (Utah App. 1992), the Court of Appeals
ruled that even though "trial courts have broad discretion in
managing the cases assigned to their courts" and that the Court
of Appeals would not "interfere with a trial court's case
19

management unless its actions amount to an abuse of discretion,"
id, at 293, a trial court may not exclude witnesses from
testifying absent a specific order with a specific deadline for
designating witnesses•

The Court of Appeals stated:

We hold that absent an order creating a
judicially imposed deadline, a trial court
may not sanction a party by excluding its
witnesses under Rule 37(b)(2).
Id. at 196 (citations omitted).
A reading of the court's comments at the PreTrial
Scheduling Conference shows that the court's instructions in this
regard were less than crystal clear.

Although the court said

that the parties should know who the witnesses would be by
November 2, 1992, he also stated that counsel should designate
their witnesses immediately if different from those stated during
the PreTrial Scheduling Conference.

Because no formal Order was

entered regarding such designations, the court's verbal and
somewhat confusing instructions during that Conference can hardly
be construed as an order.

In any event, the trial court's

interpretation of his own instructions was that defendants'
counsel gave proper notice of his witnesses to plaintiff's
counsel and that plaintiff was not prejudiced.
Given the standard set forth in the Berrett case, and
given that the trial court in this matter used his discretion to
allow the witnesses to testify as normally should be permitted,
20

the Court of Appeals should not find any error in the trial
court's decision to permit this witness to testify under these
circumstances.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff's informally requested instruction regarding
standard of care was not made in compliance with Utah Rule of
Civil Procedure 51, nor did it comply with the terms of the
PreTrial Order.

In addition, on substantive grounds, the jury

was given full and fair instructions regarding negligence and
standard of care, and the requested instruction would have added
nothing to the jury's deliberations.

Even assuming that a

sixteen-year old driver is held to an adult standard of care, the
application of that standard permits the jury to consider the
circumstances of the alleged negligence, including the driver's
age and experience.
The court's decision to allow defendants' expert
witnesses to testify was proper, because counsel for plaintiff
was apprised months before the actual trial as to the identity of
defendants' expert witness.

Furthermore, there was no order

requiring a formal disclosure of those witnesses, and without
such a specific order, witnesses cannot be prevented from
testifying at trial.
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The jury's decision herein was supported by the
testimony and evidence.

The plaintiff had an opportunity to a

full and fair trial, the jury was properly instructed and
properly deliberated, so the jury's findings and the court's
Judgment must stand.
Defendants/Appellees respectfully request that the
Court of Appeals affirm the trial court's Judgment based on the
Jury Verdict herein.
DATED this

'> -~ day of March, 1994.
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON

i^m/s. DAVIES
(ttg/rneys for Defendants and
Appellees S c o t t G. Shipley and
Stephen P. S h i p l e y

22

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that two true and correct copies of
the foregoing instrument were mailed, first-class, postage
prepaid, on this _JJ£^~ day of March, 1994, to the following:
Ned P. Siegfried
John Farrell Fay
Jim Mouritsen
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN
310 East 4500 South, Suite 620
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107

6016-1074
1sd\Summer.brf
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STANLEY SUMMERILL,
Plaintiff,

*
*
*

PRETRIAL ORDER

*

vs.
SCOTT G. SHIPLEY and
STEPHEN P. SHIPLEY,

*
*
*

Civil No. 910750793

*

Defendants.

*

Judge Rodney S. Page

The court, upon stipulation of counsel for the parties,
enters the following Pretrial Order to govern the trial of this
action:
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1.

Jurisdiction and venue are proper in this court,

and are not disputed.
NATURE OF THE CASE
2.

This case arose out of an automobile accident

involving vehicles driven by plaintiff Stanley Summerill and
defendant Scott Shipley, at or near the intersection of Utah
State Road 89 and State Road 272, Davis County, Utah on or about

October 12, 1988.

Plaintiff has brought this action against

defendants Shipley for personal injuries that he claims to have
sustained in that accident, seeking recovery of special and
general damages.

Defendant Steven Shipley is the father of

defendant Scott Shipley and was allowing Scott Shipley to drive
his vehicle at the time of the accident.

PLAINTIFFS CLAIMS;
1.

Plaintiff claims that defendant Scott Shipley was

negligent in the following particulars:
A speed too fast for conditions; improper lookout;
failure to yield; loss of control of his automobile; failure to
operate his automobile on the right side of the roadway; and
failure to exercise reasonable care.
2.

Plaintiff claims that as a proximate cause of the

defendant Scott Shipley's alleged negligence, he sustained
personal injuries, for which he is entitled to damages against
defendants Steven and Scott Shipley for the amount of his past
and future medical expenses, for lost wages allegedly sustained
by plaintiff Stanley Summerill, for general damages, for costs of
suit, and for interest at the rate of 8 percent per annum for the
date of collision on all special damages.
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DEFENDANTS' CLAIMS:
1.

Defendant Scott Shipley has denied that he was

negligent or that his conduct was the proximate cause of any
injuries and damages sustained by plaintiff.
2.

Plaintiff's claims are barred or defendants are

entitled to an offset to the extent of no-fault or other
insurance payments.
3.

The accident was unavoidable or the result of

events and circumstances beyond the control of defendant Scott
Shipley.
4.

Defendants are liable only for defendant Scott

Shipley's pro rata share of liability for plaintiff's injuries
and damages, if any.
5.

Plaintiff's injuries and damages were proximately

caused by the negligence of third persons over which defendants
had no control or right of control, specifically the negligence
of Steven Shumway.
6.

Plaintiff's injuries and damages were proximately

caused by his own negligence.
7.

Defendants may be held liable only for defendant

Scott Shipley's proportionate fault, if any.
8.

Plaintiff has failed to mitigate his damages.
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9.

Both plaintiff's comparative negligence and

failure to mitigate consist, in part only, of his failure to wear
a seat belt at the time of the accident•

IS8UE8 OF FACT
1.

Was defendant Scott Shipley negligent in one or

more of the particulars as alleged by plaintiff.
2.

If defendant Scott Shipley was negligent, was such

negligence a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries and damages,
if any?
3.

Was plaintiff negligent?

4.

If so, was such negligence a proximate cause of

the plaintiff's injuries?
5.

Was another driver (Steven Shumway) negligent?

6.

If so, was his negligence the proximate cause of

plaintiff's injuries?
7.

If both defendant Scott Shipley, plaintiff Stanley

Summerill and another driver (Shumway) were negligent, what was
the proportionate share of each person's negligence in causing
the accident and any injuries and damages resulting to plaintiff
therefrom?
8.

Was the amount of reasonable and necessary medical

expenses resulting from the accident were sustained by plaintiff?
4
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TRIAL DATE
This case is scheduled

for trial before a jury, as a

first-place trial setting, tor January

I, ' H ,

JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Counsel are submitting proposed Jury Instructions and
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for instructions are contemplated, unless counsel can demonstrate
a need Lu address unanticipated legal ox tactual issues arising
during trial.
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EXHIBITS
Counsel are to submit proposed exhibits to the clerk at
the beginning of trial.
WITNESSES
Plaintiff Summerill intends to call the following
witnesses:
Stanley Summerill, plaintiff.
Scott G. Shipley, defendant.
Stephen L. Shipley, defendant.
Trooper Roger Spiegel, investigating officer.
Lorin Summerill, plaintiff's father.
Bob Sokol.
EMT R. Rawley
EMT Tom Reynolds
William D. Ashworth, Jr., M.D.
Lynn Robinson, M.D.
Ralph B. Foley, M.D.
Curtis Campbell, M.D.
Gailen E. Lundell, D.C.
Plaintiff specifically objects to the defendant calling
any witnesses except Scott Shipley by deposition and any
witnesses the plaintiff has named.
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OTHER SCHEDULING MATTERS
Counsel for plaintiff must submit copies of all
exhibits supporting claims for special damages and a summary of
special damages by Wednesday, December 23, 1992.

SETTLEMENT
Settlement prospects are poor.
DATED this

3l£h day of

(kco^L*-

, 1992.

BY THE COURT:

The Honorable Rodney S. Page
Second District Court
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ADDENDUM 2

INSTRUCTION NO.

'^

A person has i duty to use reasonable care to ivoid
injuring other people or property

"Negligence" simply means

the failure to use reasonable ><ire.

HeaGuni ib Lr »\ire does net
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INSTRUCTION NO-

^

The amount of care that is considered "reasonable"
depends on the situation.

Some situations require more caution

because an ordinary person would understand that more danger is
involved.

In other situations, Less care is expected, such as

where the risk of danger is lower or where the situation happens
so suddenly that an ordinary person would not appreciate the
danger.

INSTRUCTION NO.

][

*

A reasonable careful person may assume that other people
(ij are reasonably intelligent

' ^) ::.v *-- normal sight and

hearing, an I i » uM I 1 < 1 >< , t i j *

.

*

. .

y o 11 e t u I

However, i reasonably careful person may n it i.n.r a obvious
risks created by other persons.

INSTRUCTION NO.

)l

If you find that the defendant was negligent but that the
plaintiff's injuries were caused by the act of a third person,
and you also find that a reasonably prudent person in the
defendant's situation could have foreseen the third person's act
as a probable consequence of the defendant's negligence, then
you may find the defendant liable to the plaintiff.

However, if

your finding is that a reasonably prudent person would not have
foreseen the third person's act as a probable consequence of the
defendant's negligence, then the defendant is not responsible
for the plaintiff's injuries and your verdict should be for the
defendant.

INSTRUCTION NO. 23

It is the duty of every driver to use reasonable care to
avoid danger.
1.

In that regard, every driver is obliged:

To keep a lookout for other vehicles, and highway

conditions which reasonably may be anticipated.
2.

To keep the vehicle under proper control.

3.

To drive at a safe speed, having proper regard for

the width, surface and condition of the highway, other traffic,
visibility, and any existing or potential hazards. •
4.

To drive in one lane whenever possible and to change

lanes only after observing that it can be done safely and after
giving the appropriate signal.
5.

to yield the right-of-way to any oncoming traffic

when merging onto a freeway.

INSTRUCTION NO- 7A

It is the duty of the driver of any vehicle to exercise
ordinary care at all times to avoid placing others in danger and
to obey all statutes, ordinances, and rules of the road designed
to promote safety.

Failure to do so is negligence.

INSTRUCTION NO.

^

A violation of a safety law is evidence of negligence if
it is shown that:
1.

The person injured belonged to a class of people the

law intented to protect, and
2.

The law intended to protect against the type of harm

which in fact occurred as a result of the violation.

However,

there are five exceptions:
(1)

When following the law would have created an

even greater risk of harm.
(2)

When the person who violated that law was

faced with an emergency that the person did not create, and the
person could not follow the law.
(3)

When the person who violated the law made a

reasonable effort to comply with the law, but was unable to
comply.
(4)

When the person who violated the law could not

comply with the law because the person was incapable of doing so.
(5)

When the person violating the law was

incapable of understanding the requirements of the law.

The person violating the law has the burden of proving
one of the exceptions.

If an exception is proven by a

preponderance of the evidence, you must disregard the violation
of the safety law, and simply decide whether the person acted
with reasonable care under the circumstances.

INSTRUCTION NO. -2<*

In the absence of reasonable cause to believe otherwise,
every driver has a right to assume that other persons will obey
the law and exercise reasonable care.

INSTRUCTION NO. ^ 7

The law provides that any person driving a motor vehicle
on a public highway shall keep a proper lookout.

A "proper

lookout" means maintaining the lookout that an ordinarily
careful person would use in light of all present conditions and
those reasonably to be anticipated.
A "proper lookout" includes a duty to see objects and
conditions in plain sight, to see that which is open and
apparent and to realize obvious dangers.

This duty does not

merely require looking, but also requires observing and
understanding other traffic and the general situation.

INSTRUCTION NO.

2

&

Every driver has a duty to drive at a speed that is safe
under the circumstances, with proper regard for existing and
potential hazards.
The posted speed limit at the place of this accident was
55 miles per hour.

This speed limit is reasonable in the

absence of any special hazards.

Speed in excess of the posted

limit constitutes evidence of negligence.

Regardless of the

speed limit, all drivers must drive at an appropriate reduced
speed when approaching and crossing an intersection, when
pedestrians are present, or when required to do so because of
weather or other special highway conditions.

